Interests & Skills


JavaScript, Python, Node.js, Chrome Devtools Protocol, Puppeteer, Data analysis, Web development (C#, ASP.NET MVC 5, ASP.NET Web API, Hangfire, Razor View), Mobile Application Development (React Native), SQL - PL/SQL, ORM (Entity Framework), AWS Services


Web Privacy, Online Tracking, Web measurement, Browser fingerprinting



Browsers including Chrome recently reduced the user-agent string to make it less identifying. Simultaneously, Chrome introduced several highly identifying (or high-entropy) the user-agent client hints (UA-CH) to allow access to browser properties that are redacted from the user-agent string. In this empirical study, we attempt to characterize the effects of these major changes through a large-scale web measurement on the top 100K websites. Using an instrumented crawler, we quantify access to high-entropy browser features through UA-CH HTTP headers and the JavaScript API (mainly the navigator.userAgentData.getHighEntropyValues method). With this study we measure access delegation to third parties and investigate whether the new client hints are already used by tracking, advertising and browser fingerprinting scripts.

Email addresses—or identifiers derived from them—are known to be used by data brokers and advertisers for cross-site, cross-platform, and persistent identification of potentially unsuspecting individuals. In order to find out whether access to online forms is misused by online trackers, we present a measurement of email and password collection that occur before form submission on the top 100K websites.
We developed LeakInspector to help publishers and end-users to audit third parties that harvest personal information from online forms without their knowledge or consent as a coutermeasure to avoid the leakage of personal information.


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    Computerbeveiliging & Ind.Crypt.Leuven Office: B01-29, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10 - bus 2452, 3001 Heverlee, België